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Christian Bioethics 2008 14(2):175-186; doi:10.1093/cb/cbn009
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© The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of The Journal of Christian Bioethics, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

This article appears in the following Christian Bioethics issue: Elizabeth Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy": Fifty Years Later [View the issue table of contents]

Her Conclusions—With Which He Is in Love: Why Hume Would Fancy Anscombe

Margaret Watkins

Baylor University

Address correspondence to: Margaret Watkins, Philosophy Department, Baylor University, One Bear Place #97273, Waco, TX 76798-7273. E-mail: margaret_watkins{at}baylor.edu.


  Abstract

The features of Hume's philosophy which I have mentioned, like many other features of it, would incline me to think that Hume was a mere—brilliant—sophist; and his procedures are certainly sophistical. But I am forced, not to reverse, but to add to, this judgment by a peculiarity of Hume's philosophizing: namely that although he reaches his conclusions—with which he is in love—by sophistical methods, his considerations constantly open up very deep and important problems ... hence he is a very profound and great philosopher, in spite of his sophistry.1

Keywords: Anscombe, ethics, Hume, is and ought, moral obligation, pride, virtue


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